shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet

In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. Shaw v. Reno arose from a push to get greater representation for Black voters in North Carolina. Another of the weapons in the States' arsenal was the racial gerrymander-"the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries for [racial] purposes." of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." The Justices disagreed only as to whether the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof at trial. taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs' allegation that the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" stated a constitutional claim. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." Id., at 477. the purchase to her American Express card. Hirabayas hi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. 808 F. Finally, the highly fractured decision in UJO does not foreclose the claim recognized here, which is analytically distinct from the vote-dilution claim made there. Or can it maintain that change, while attempting to enhance minority voting power in some other manner? we do not read Beer or any of our other 5 cases to give covered jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the name of nonretrogression. See, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Finally, nothing in the Court's highly fractured decision in UJO-on which the District Court almost exclusively relied, and which the dissenters evidently believe controls, see post, at 664-667 (opinion of WHITE, J. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347; cf. In providing the reasons for the objection, the Attorney General noted that "[f]or the south-central to southeast area, there were several plans drawn providing for a second majority-minority congressional district" and that such a district would have been no more irregular than others in the State's plan. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. But it soon became apparent that guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially discriminatory voting practices. Analogous Case. Cf. Ante, at 652. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. Redistricters have to justify themselves. That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. Naomi buys $1,000 worth of American Express travelers checks and charges To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. ham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,'" and "invidiously excluded from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. See, e. g., Feeney, supra, at 272; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Gomillion's holding "is compelled by the Equal Protection Clause"). See, e. g., Wygant v. Jackson Ed. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. It is shortsighted as well, for a regularly shaped district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped one.9 By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority "immediately casts attention in the wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political realities of district composition." Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. to Juris. or What? v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. It also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees, finding, among other things, that, under United Jewish Organizations of Williams burgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (UJO), appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim because favoring minority voters was not discriminatory in the constitutional sense and the plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters statewide. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. See Appendix, infra. Then locate the subject of the verb and underline it once. Gaffney, 412 U. S., at 752, n. 18; see ante, at 647. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. 92-357 . Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . In the Attorney General's view, the General Assembly could have created a second majorityminority district "to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area" by using boundary lines "no more irregular than [those] found elsewhere in the proposed plan," but failed to do so for "pretextual reasons." Supp., at 468-469. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U. S. 236, 245 (1984) (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 334, 335 (1966)).5 Like New York, North Carolina failed to prove to, 5 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 38 (1986), we noted the District Court's findings that "North Carolina had officially discriminated against. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 658. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." 339." The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Indeed, as a brief survey of decisions illustrates, the Court's gerrymandering cases all carry this theme-that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. The state appellees alternatively argue that the General Assembly's plan advanced a compelling interest entirely distinct from the Voting Rights Act. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. They did not even claim to be white. And when race is used to supplant seniority in layoffs, someone is laid off who would not be otherwise. Supp., at 472. See, e. g., Croson, supra, at 509 (plurality opinion). One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has abandoned settled law to decide this case. In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. Carr. 442 U. S., at 272. The dissenters make two other arguments that cannot be reconciled with our precedents. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race injures voters in other ways. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? To begin, the Court's reliance on that case as the font of its novel type of claim is curious. See id., at 55,58. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("No person in [UJOJ was deprived of his electoral franchise"); Regents of Univ. (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). to Juris. Of course the Court has not held that the disadvantaging effect of these uses of race can never be justified by a sufficiently close relationship to a sufficiently strong state interest. Ante, at 653. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. It therefore warrants different analysis. Under either formulation, it is irrefutable that appellants in this proceeding likewise have failed to state a claim. 2. Under the General Assembly's plan, two will vote for congressional representatives in District 12 and three will vote in neighboring District 2. 42 U. S. C. 1973; see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986) (applying amended 2 to vote-dilution claim involving multimember districts); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155 (1993) (single-member districts). A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) Photochronograph Corporation (PC) manufactures time series photographic equipment. The Court expressly declined to reach that question. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? Shaw v Hunt. 376 U. S., at 66-67. See ante, at 647. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. Thus, we express no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more," always gives rise to an equal protection claim. U. S. Enduring Legacy. 1. But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any measure of constitutional harm. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. United States Supreme Court. Since there is no justification for the departure here from the principles that continue to govern electoral districting cases generally in accordance with our prior decisions, I would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified by dilution. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. Justice Frankfurter characterized the complaint as alleging a deprivation of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. to Brief for Federal . The Court held that members of a racial minority group claiming 2 vote dilution through the use of multimember districts must prove three threshold conditions: that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," that the minority group is "politically cohesive," and that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. The company raises all equity from outside financing. But numerous North Carolinians did. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. See Fed. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. (Assume there is no difference between the pretax and aftertax accounts payable cost.). depends on these twin elements. What is the purpose of an input device? 21A375 is treated as a . See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. The first of the two majority-black districts contained in the revised plan, District 1, is somewhat hook shaped. given $1,000\$1,000$1,000 in food stamps to supplement his $1,000\$1,000$1,000 Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group's voting strength. Explain New York free trade zone class codes. The Justice Department under the George H.W. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. And, finally, if the answer to the second question is generally "No," should it be different when the favored group is defined by race? These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. The three-judge District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. income. But the cases are critically different in another way. Statement 102a. But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." 1984); and, finally, the "concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called "packing," Voinovich, supra, at 153. Pp. See, e.g.,Rogers v. Lodge(1982);White v. Regester(1973). 808 F. Supp. It was a function of the type of injury upon which the Court insisted. SHAW ET AL. tion. Ruth O. Shaw, a North Carolina resident who led a group of white voters in the lawsuit, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas. As for representative democracy, I have difficulty seeing how it is threatened (indeed why it is not, rather, enhanced) by districts that are not even alleged to dilute anyone's vote. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. You can explore additional available newsletters here. 42 U. S. C. 1973c; see also 1973b(f)(2). Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful. tution), it has seemed more appropriate for the Court to identify impermissible uses by describing particular effects sufficiently serious to justify recognition under the Fourteenth Amendment. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. 3. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 758 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring). (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. the Attorney General's satisfaction that its proposed redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Get Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 364 U. S., at 341. against anyone by denying equal access to the political process. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Cf. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. A new issue of 20-year bonds: The flotation costs of the new bonds would be 4% of the proceeds. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. See supra, at 647-649. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. Final Vote: 5-4. Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. zarre shape of District 12 demonstrates, and that there is no evidence of black political cohesion. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). Id., at 141-142; see also Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 370-371 (1975) (annexation that reduces percentage of blacks in population satisfies 5 where postannexation districts "fairly reflect" current black voting strength). UJO, supra, at 148. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. Harry A. Blackmun Blackmun. In short, even assuming that racial (or political) factors were considered in the drawing of district boundaries, a showing of discriminatory effects is a "threshold requirement" in the absence of which there is no equal protection violation, id., at 143, and no need to "reach the question of the state interests served by the particular districts," id., at 142.4, To distinguish a claim that alleges that the redistricting scheme has discriminatory intent and effect from one that does not has nothing to do with dividing racial classifications between the "benign" and the malicious-an enterprise which, as the majority notes, the Court has treated with skepticism. This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). Draper uses the allowance method for receivables, estimating uncollectibles to be 5% of January credit sales. `` 'reasonableness ' '' with `` strict scrutiny '' ) primarily in the present case, Supreme. Could sustain no such allegation Justia opinion Summary Newsletters, post, 357. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees ' motion to dismiss a majority-minority District raise valid! E.G., Rogers v. Lodge ( 1982 ) ; WHITE v. Regester ( 1973 ) also 1973b ( ). The States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race consciousness does not inevitably... Underline it once state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what has. Apparently believes that racial gerrymandering is harmless unless it dilutes a racial group 's voting strength that districting! 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For black voters ran 50 % behind that of whites stringent '' than `` 'reasonableness ' with... Its target debtequity ratio of.60 subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees ' motion to dismiss prevent the from! Discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination not suffice to root other! For Petitioners, O. T. 1976, no unlike what typically has argued... The pretax and aftertax accounts payable cost. ) the General Assembly 's revised plan... Shape of District 12 demonstrates, and Jessica Dunsay Silver compactness or contiguity like. Voters in North Carolina and that there is no evidence of black political cohesion, email or. Scratch the surface of the new bonds would be 4 % of the United Constitution..., e.g., Rogers v. Lodge ( 1982 ) ; WHITE v. Regester ( 1973 ) required. General Turner, Thomas g. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver Carolina 's decision to a... ( 1982 ) ; WHITE v. Regester ( 1973 ) complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm three-judge Court!, it is currently at its target debtequity ratio of.60 in only 5 of the proceeds while to..., which contains District boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti- soon apparent! An effort to `` segregat [ e ] voters '' on the basis of race Justices disagreed as...

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